

The seal of the Auditor of State of Ohio is a large, circular watermark in the background. It features a sun rising over a landscape with fields and a river. The text "THE SEAL OF THE AUDITOR OF STATE OF OHIO" is written around the perimeter of the seal.

**NORTHWEST OHIO AREA COMPUTER SERVICES COOPERATIVE (NOACSC)
STATE REGION - ISA, ALLEN COUNTY**

SERVICE ORGANIZATION CONTROLS REPORT (SOC 1)

APRIL 1, 2016 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2017



Dave Yost • Auditor of State

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Independent Service Auditor's Report

Board of Directors
Northwest Ohio Area Computer Services Cooperative (NOACSC)
645 South Main Street
Lima, OH 45804

To Members of the Board:

Scope

We have examined NOACSC's description of its Dell PowerEdge R710 system for processing transactions for users of the Uniform School Accounting System (USAS), Uniform Staff Payroll System (USPS), and School Asset Accounting System/Equipment Inventory Subsystem (SAAS/EIS) throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017 (description) and the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of the controls included in the description to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description, based on the criteria identified in "Management's Assertion" (assertion). The controls and control objectives included in the description are those that management of NOACSC believes are likely to be relevant to user entities' internal control over financial reporting, and the description does not include those aspects of the Dell PowerEdge R710 system that are not likely to be relevant to user entities' internal control over financial reporting.

The information included in section 5, "Other Information Provided by the Service Organization" is presented by management of NOACSC to provide additional information and is not a part of NOACSC's description of its system made available to user entities during the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017. Information about NOACSC's ITC Profile including site data, other site staff, hardware data, and user entity site data, has not been subjected to the procedures applied in the examination of the description of the system and of the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of controls to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description of the system and, accordingly, we express no opinion on it.

The description indicates that certain control objectives specified in the description can be achieved only if complementary user entity controls assumed in the design of NOACSC's controls are suitably designed and operating effectively, along with related controls at the service organization. Our examination did not extend to such complementary user entity controls, and we have not evaluated the suitability of the design or operating effectiveness of such complementary user entity controls.

Service Organization's Responsibilities

In section 2, NOACSC has provided an assertion about the fairness of the presentation of the description and suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of the controls to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description. NOACSC is responsible for preparing the description and assertion, including the completeness, accuracy, and method of presentation of the description and assertion, providing the services covered by the description, specifying the control objectives and stating them in the description, identifying the risks that threaten the achievement of the control objectives, selecting the criteria stated in the assertion, and designing, implementing, and documenting controls that are suitably designed and operating effectively to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description.

Service Auditor's Responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the fairness of the presentation of the description and on the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of the controls to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description, based on our examination. Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, based on the criteria in management's assertion, the description is fairly presented and the controls were suitably designed and operating effectively to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017. We believe that the evidence we obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

An examination of a description of a service organization's system and the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of controls involves

- performing procedures to obtain evidence about the fairness of the presentation of the description and the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of the controls to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description, based on the criteria in management's assertion.
- assessing the risks that the description is not fairly presented and that the controls were not suitably designed or operating effectively to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description.
- testing the operating effectiveness of those controls that management considers necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the related control objectives stated in the description were achieved.
- evaluating the overall presentation of the description, suitability of the control objectives stated in the description, and suitability of the criteria specified by the service organization in its assertion.

Inherent Limitations

The description is prepared to meet the common needs of a broad range of user entities and their auditors who audit and report on user entities' financial statements and may not, therefore, include every aspect of the system that each individual user entity may consider important in its own particular environment. Because of their nature, controls at a service organization may not prevent, or detect and correct, all misstatements in processing or reporting transactions. Also, the projection to the future of any evaluation of the fairness of the presentation of the description, or conclusions about the suitability of the design or operating effectiveness of the controls to achieve the related control objectives, is subject to the risk that controls at a service organization may become ineffective.

Description of Tests of Controls

The specific controls tested and the nature, timing, and results of those tests are listed in section 4.

Opinion

In our opinion, in all material respects, based on the criteria described in NOACSC's assertion

- a. the description fairly presents the Dell PowerEdge R710 system that was designed and implemented throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017.
- b. the controls related to the control objectives stated in the description were suitably designed to provide reasonable assurance that the control objectives would be achieved if the controls operated effectively throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017 and user entities applied the complementary controls assumed in the design of NOACSC's controls throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017.

- c. the controls operated effectively to provide reasonable assurance that the control objectives stated in the description were achieved throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017 if complementary user entity controls assumed in the design of NOACSC's controls operated effectively throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017

Restricted Use

This report, including the description of tests of controls and results thereof in section 4 , is intended solely for the information and use of management of NOACSC, user entities of NOACSC's system during some or all of the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017, and their auditors who audit and report on such user entities' financial statements or internal control over financial reporting and have a sufficient understanding to consider it, along with other information, including information about controls implemented by user entities themselves, when assessing the risks of material misstatement of user entities' financial statements. This report is not intended to be, and should not be, used by anyone other than the specified parties.



Dave Yost
Auditor of State
Columbus, Ohio

August 3, 2017

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MANAGEMENT'S ASSERTION

We have prepared the description of the Northwest Ohio Area Computer Services Cooperative's (NOACSC) Dell PowerEdge R710 system entitled "Description of the Service Organization's System," for processing user entities' Uniform School Accounting System (USAS), Uniform Staff Payroll System (USPS), and School Asset Accounting System/Equipment Inventory Subsystem (SAAS/EIS) transactions throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017 (description) for user entities of the system during some or all of the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017, and their auditors who audit and report on such user entities' financial statements or internal control over financial reporting and have sufficient understanding to consider it, along with other information, including information about controls implemented by user entities of the system themselves, when assessing the risks of material misstatement of user entities' financial statements.

The description indicates that certain control objectives specified in the description can be achieved only if complementary user entity controls assumed in the design of NOACSC's controls are suitably designed and operating effectively, along with related controls at the service organization. The description does not extend to controls of the user entities.

We confirm, to the best of our knowledge and belief, that

- a) the description fairly presents the Dell PowerEdge R710 system made available to user entities of the system during some or all of the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017, for processing their transactions as it relates to controls that are likely to be relevant to user entities' internal control over financial reporting. The NOACSC service organization has a vendor relationship with the State Software Development Team (SSDT) located at the Northwest Ohio Computer Association (NWOCA) and uses the USAS, USPS, and SAAS/EIS application software as provided by the SSDT. The criteria we used in making this assertion were that the description:
 - i) presents how the system made available to user entities of the system was designed and implemented to process relevant user entity transactions, including, if applicable,
 - 1) the types of services provided, including, as appropriate, the classes of transactions processed.
 - 2) the procedures, within both automated and manual systems, by which those services are provided, including, as appropriate, procedures by which transactions are initiated, authorized, recorded, processed, corrected as necessary, and transferred to the reports and other information prepared for user entities of the system.
 - 3) the information used in the performance of the procedures including, if applicable, related accounting records, whether electronic or manual, and supporting information involved in initiating, authorizing, recording, processing, and reporting transactions; this includes the correction of incorrect information and how information is transferred to the reports and other information prepared for user entities.



Northwest Ohio Area Computer Services Cooperative

- 4) how the system captures and addresses significant events and conditions other than transactions.
 - 5) the process used to prepare reports and other information for user entities.
 - 6) services performed by a subservice organization, if any, including whether the carve-out method or the inclusive method has been used in relation to them.
 - 7) the specified control objectives and controls designed to achieve those objectives, including as applicable, complementary user entity controls assumed in the design of the service organization's controls.
 - 8) other aspects of our control environment, risk assessment process, information and communications (including the related business processes), control activities, and monitoring activities that are relevant to the services provided.
- ii) includes relevant details of changes to the service organization's system during the period covered by the description.
 - iii) does not omit or distort information relevant to the service organization's system, while acknowledging that the description is prepared to meet the common needs of a broad range of user entities of the system and their user auditors, and may not, therefore, include every aspect of the Dell PowerEdge R710 system that each individual user entity of the system and its auditor may consider important in its own particular environment.
- b) the controls related to the control objectives stated in the description were suitably designed and operating effectively throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017, to achieve those control objectives if the and user entities applied the complementary controls assumed in the design of NOACSC's controls throughout the period April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017. The criteria we used in making this assertion were that
- i) the risks that threaten the achievement of the control objectives stated in the description have been identified by management of the service organization.
 - ii) the controls identified in the description would, if operating effectively, provide reasonable assurance that those risks would not prevent the control objectives stated in the description from being achieved.
 - iii) the controls were consistently applied as designed, including whether manual controls were applied by individuals who have the appropriate competence and authority.

Ray Burden


Executive Director

SECTION 3 – DESCRIPTION OF THE SERVICE ORGANIZATION'S SYSTEM

CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND RELATED CONTROLS

The Northwest Ohio Area Computer Services Cooperative (NOACSC) control objectives and related controls are included in section 4 of this report, "Independent Service Auditor's Description of Tests of Controls and Results," to eliminate the redundancy that would result from listing them here in Section 3 and repeating them in Section 4. Although the control objectives and related controls are included in Section 4, they are, nevertheless, an integral part of the NOACSC's description of controls.

OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS



The NOACSC is one of 19 government computer service organizations serving more than 973 educational entities and 1.475 million students in the state of Ohio. These service organizations, known as Information Technology Centers (ITCs), and their users make up the Ohio Education Computer Network (OECN) authorized pursuant to Section 3301.075 of the Revised Code. Such sites, in conjunction with the Ohio Department of Education (ODE), comprise a statewide delivery system to provide comprehensive, cost-efficient accounting and other administrative and instructional computer services for participating Ohio entities. Funding for this network and for the NOACSC is derived from the state of Ohio and from user fees.

ITCs provide information technology services to school districts, community "charter" schools, JVS/career & technical, educational service centers (ESCs) and parochial schools; however, not all entities subscribe to the same services. Throughout the remainder of the report, the term "user entity" will be used to describe an entity which uses one of more of the following applications:

- Uniform School Accounting System (USAS).
- Uniform Staff Payroll System (USPS).
- School Asset Accounting System/Equipment Inventory Subsystem (SAAS/EIS).

ITCs are organized as either consortia under ORC 3313.92 or Council of Governments (COG) under ORC 167. ORC 3313.92 allows for school districts to create a partnership (a consortia) to resolve mutual needs. One of the members of the consortia is designated as fiscal agent. The fiscal agent provides all accounting, purchasing, and personnel services for the consortia. A "COG" under ORC chapter 167 allows for one or more governmental entities to join together to form a new legal entity. A COG can have its own treasurer, make its own purchases, hire staff, and have debt obligations. NOACSC is organized under ORC 167 and is not required to have a board of education serve as its fiscal agent.

RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING

Control Environment

Operations are under the control of the executive director and the governing board. The governing board is composed of two members from each county elected by a majority vote of all charter member user entities in each county, plus one representative from the fiscal agent. The board meets approximately once a month and at other times as deemed necessary.

The NOACSC employs a staff of 18 individuals, including the executive director and is supported by the following functional areas:

<i>Fiscal Services:</i>	Provides end user support and training for the NOACSC user entities for the state software applications, including USAS, USPS, and SAAS/EIS.
<i>Technology:</i>	Provides a variety of educational technology services to subscribing NOACSC user entities including software and Internet access, training, technology planning, and technical assistance.
<i>Student Services:</i>	Support end users in all aspect of the student service applications, Data Analysis for Student Learning (DASL).
<i>Network Support:</i>	Provides user training and support for the NOACSC computer system and its networked communication system.

The NOACSC is generally limited to recording user entity transactions and processing the related data. Users are responsible for authorization and initiation of all transactions. Management reinforces this segregation of duties as a part of its new employee's orientation process, through on the job training, and by restricting employee access to user data. Changes to user data are infrequent. Only experienced NOACSC employees may alter user data and only at the request of the user entity.

The NOACSC follows personnel policies and procedures adopted by the Governing Board. Detailed job descriptions exist for all positions. The NOACSC is constantly re-evaluating its need for personnel to provide for the increasing range of services provided. The reporting structure and

job descriptions are periodically updated to create a more effective entity.

The NOACSC's hiring practices place an emphasis on the hiring and development of skilled information technology professionals. All the NOACSC staff members are required to attend professional development and other training as a condition of continued employment. Each full-time staff member must attend at least 20 hours of approved professional development training annually, and part-time staff member training hours are prorated. The NOACSC tracks continuing education requirements for its employees. The NOACSC pays 100% of the incurred costs in attending professional development seminars. Employee evaluations are conducted annually by the executive director. The board performs an annual evaluation of the executive director.

The NOACSC is also subject to ITC Site Reviews by the Ohio Department of Education and the Management Council – Ohio Education Computer Network (MCOECN). These site reviews are conducted by a team consisting of an employee of the Ohio Department of Education (ODE), two current and/or former user entity administrators, two current and/or former ITC Directors, and one additional team member to provide training to subsequent teams. Approximately three to five ITC site reviews are conducted annually. The sites chosen for review are designated by the OECN Oversight Advisory Committee as approved by ODE. The guidelines and recommended procedures for these reviews are based on the Ohio Administrative Code, which cover the following areas: governance, administration, finance, personnel and staff development, physical facilities, hardware, software, user in-service, and operations.

The NOACSC has Service Level Agreements (SLA) with their user entities for certain computer, data processing, and application services. The user entities agree to pay a fee based upon a fee schedule set forth by the governing board and they agree to abide by the security policies implemented by the NOACSC. These SLAs are in effect beginning July 1, 2008, and will be in effect until terminated in writing by either the user entity or the NOACSC.

Risk Assessment

The NOACSC does not have a formal risk management process; however, the governing board actively participates in the oversight of the entity. As a regular part of its activity, the governing board addresses:

- New technology.
- Realignment of the NOACSC organization to provide better service.
- Personnel issues, including hiring, termination, and evaluations.
- Additional services provided to user entities and other entities.
- Changes in the operating environment as a result of ODE requirements, Auditor of State (AOS) and other accounting pronouncements, and legislative issues.

In addition, the NOACSC has identified operational risks resulting from the nature of the services provided to the user entities. These risks are primarily associated with computerized information systems. These risks are monitored as described under "Monitoring" below and in additional detail throughout the "IT General Control" section of this report.

Monitoring

The NOACSC is structured so that each staff member ultimately reports to the executive director. Key employees have worked here for a number of years and are experienced with the systems and controls at the NOACSC. The NOACSC executive director and network services manager monitor the quality of internal control performance as a routine part of their activities. To assist them in this monitoring, NOACSC uses a variety of "key indicator" reports to monitor the processes involved in processing transactions for user entities.

Hardware, software, network, database integrity, Internet usage, computer security and user help desk reports are monitored on an ongoing basis by departmental management. Some of these reports are automatically run through a scheduler program and sent to management via e-mail. Exceptions to normal processing related to hardware, software or procedural problems are logged and resolved daily. In addition, the executive director receives the same reports and monitors for interrelated and recurring problems.

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

The aspects of the information and communication component of internal control as they affect the services provided to user entities are discussed within the "IT General Control" section.

IT GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND RELATED CONTROLS

Development and Implementation of New Applications or Systems

The NOACSC staff members do not perform system development activities. Instead, the NOACSC utilizes the software developed and supplied by the State Software Development Team (SSDT), located at the Northwest Ohio Computer Association (NWOCA), another ITC of the OECN. The ODE determines the scope of software development for state-supported systems. The Fiscal State Software Oversight Committee (SOC), which consists of members from the Management Council of the OECN (MCOECN), the Ohio Association of School Business Officials (OASBO), the ODE and the SSDT, assists in prioritizing specific goals and objectives. The SOC meets as needed to monitor SSDT projects and provide feedback on project priorities.

Changes to Existing Applications and Systems

End users have access to the SSDT website that contains user and technical documentation for the applications. Specific support issues or questions can be communicated to the SSDT via helpdesk software. Solutions are communicated directly to NOACSC staff. Global issues are posted to the SSDT support website.

The NOACSC personnel do not perform program maintenance activities for USAS, USPS, or SAAS. Instead, they utilize the applications supplied to them by the SSDT. The OECN requires the ITC to keep the version of each application current based on the provider's standard for continued support. Procedures are in place to ensure the SSDT developed applications are used as distributed. Upon notification of their availability from SSDT, ITCs obtain quarterly updates by downloading zipped files from the SSDT's download site. The source code is not distributed with these files. Release notes, which explain the changes, enhancements and problems corrected, are provided via the SSDT website. User and system manager manuals are also made available via the SSDT website with these releases. In order to maintain continued support of the application software provided by the SSDT, ITCs are expected to apply updates in a timely manner. Thirty (30) days after the release date is the expectation to maintain support from SSDT.

The NOACSC uses a software utility called OECN_INSTALL to unpack these zipped files and install each individual package into its proper OECN directory. The OECN_INSTALL utility has an INSTALL_PACKAGE procedure with several functions that installs full package releases, partial releases or patches on the system. This utility ensures that all required components are installed properly and consistently.

Only vendor-supplied changes are made to the operating system or system software documentation. As a participating member of the MCOECN, an ITC can enter into a cooperative agreement, "Campuswide Software License Grant (CSLG) and Education Software Library (ESL) Program", through the MCOECN, for acquiring and/or providing software maintenance services for a limited series of Hewlett Packard (HP), and other supplier's, software packages as approved by the MCOECN board of trustees.

The services acquired and/or provided by the MCOECN under the agreement include the following:

- Provide for the acquisition and distribution of software media to the participating ITCs for a limited series of HP software packages as approved by the board of trustees of the MCOECN.

- Provide telephone technical support to the participant's technical staff for a limited series of HP software packages approved by the board of trustees of the MCOECN.
- Track and maintain an accurate listing of all HP hardware and software covered under the agreement.
- Provide and maintain support on one (1) license of Process Software's Multinet TCP/IP stack for each system registered under this program.

As a participating member of the MCOECN program, the participating ITCs agree to the following:

- Maintain its status as a member in good standing of the MCOECN as a qualification for participating in (or continuing to participate in) this program.
- Read, sign, and comply with the rules and regulations of the CSLG Program as operated by the MCOECN.
- Provide unrestricted privileged access to all computer systems covered under the agreement for the purposes of identifying and/or correcting problems, distributing software, or assuring licensing compliance.
- Provide HP or MCOECN representatives, upon prior written notice, with physical access to computer facilities at reasonable times during normal business hours to inspect sites and system records for compliance with the terms of the CSLG and ESL Programs.
- Make payments to MCOECN for services under the agreement within 30 days of the receipt of an invoice for said services.

Before new releases are installed at the NOACSC, a backup of the application or operating system affected by the change is prepared to ensure retention of the existing application or operating system in case of an error stemming from the upgrade process. There wasn't an upgrade to the operating system during the audit period.

Documentation for the current version of the operating system and new releases are provided on the HP web site. New releases include documented changes to the operating system and implementation procedures. The NOACSC is able to purchase the operating system software at a reduced cost under MCOECN. No new releases were installed during the audit period.

IT Security

The NOACSC has a security policy that outlines the responsibilities of user entity personnel, the NOACSC personnel, and any individual or group not belonging to a user entity or the NOACSC. The NOACSC uses the signatures on the authorized account application forms as an acceptance to the security policies of the NOACSC. Every other year user access is confirmed with user entity management through a positive confirmation process. A list of users and their corresponding access rights within the user entity is generated and sent to the respective treasurer. The treasurer is required to confirm that all users are valid active users and their corresponding identifier/user access is appropriate. In addition, every 120 days, the account review team meets to review and discuss OpenVMS account adds, deletes, and changes for the last 120 days. All changes to districts are reviewed and discussed.

Users from the user entities are granted access upon the receipt of a written "Authorized Account Application" form from the superintendent, treasurer, and/or supervisor. These authorization forms are sent to the executive director or manager network/student, who will then update the account and e-mail the treasurer regarding the newly established account. The NOACSC staff is granted access within the scope of their assigned duties, but only as may be necessary to maintain the data structure, research and correct problems, and provide backup capabilities. The manager network/student establishes, grants, and reviews access rights for data center personnel and an authorization form is not used.

The NOACSC policies and procedures are partly enforced through the use of system alarms and audits. The following security alarms and audits have been enabled through the operating system to monitor security violations on the NOACSC system:

- ACL: Gives file owners the option to selectively alarm certain files and events. Read, write, execute, delete, or control modes can be audited.
- AUDIT: Enabled by default to produce a record of when other security alarms were enabled or disabled.
- AUTHORIZATION: Enables monitoring of changes made to the system UAF or network proxy authorization file in addition to changes to the rights database.
- BREAK-IN: Produces a record of break-in attempts. The DIALUP, LOCAL, REMOTE, NETWORK, and DETACHED break-in types can be monitored.
- LOGFAILURE: Provides a record of logon failures. The BATCH, DIALUP, LOCAL, REMOTE, NETWORK, SUBPROCESS and DETACHED logon failure types can be monitored.

In addition, the following security audits have been enabled through OpenVMS to monitor for additional security violations:

- INSTALL: Audits modifications made to the last known file through the install utility.
- TIME: Monitors modification of the system time.
- SYSGEN: Monitors modifications of a system parameter with the system generation utilities, SYSGEN or AUTOGEN.

A batch processed command procedure executes each night to extract security violations from the audit log and creates summary and detail reports. These reports, also called security monitor reports, are e-mailed to the executive director and network services manager and reviewed daily. If an event is deemed suspicious, further investigation is performed to determine the exact nature of the event and the corrective action needed.

The NOACSC utilizes anti-virus software to scan inbound and outbound e-mail. Virus definitions are updated daily, and infected items are deleted.

Primary logical access control to the HP computers is provided by security provisions of the operating system. Individual user profiles are used to grant access rights and privileges for the system. This includes access to data, programs and system utilities. When a user logs in to use the system interactively, or when a batch or network job starts, it creates a process which includes the identity of the user. The operating system

manages access to the process information using its authorization data and internal security mechanisms.

The NOACSC utilizes proxy logins. A proxy login enables a user logged in at a remote node to be logged in automatically to a specific account at the local node, without having to supply any access control information. A proxy login differs from an interactive login because an interactive login requires a user to supply a user name and password before the user can perform any interactive operations.

Associated with each object recognized by the operating system may be an Access Control List (ACL). When an access request is made to an object, ACLs are always checked first. An ACL may either grant or deny access to the user requesting it.

Access to the operating system command line is restricted through the use of login scripts and the CAPTIVE flag. All user accounts are set up with the CAPTIVE flag which restricts access to the command line. The CAPTIVE flags are typically not used for administrative accounts (NOACSC employees or system accounts) because they require command line access.

Users must provide a valid operating system username and password to authenticate to the USAS and USPS web applications. Once authenticated, users are automatically given only those privileges assigned in each user's default login security profile. The SSDT developed a program called OECN_RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service which, in conjunction with VXS created by the SSDT, allows users to authenticate through a XML interface using standard operating system authentication policies. If authentication is successful, the RPC service "impersonates" the user by acquiring an operating system security profile of the authenticated user (i.e. default privileges and security identifiers). Once the RPC has acquired the corresponding security profile the operating system process has the same security rights as the authenticated user. The network client then provides a code indicating the user entity data to be used. The RPC service uses the user entity code to define logical definitions to associate the server process with the desired user entity data.

Only default privileges from the user's authorization file record are enabled during a session. The session does not enable any authorized privileges. Therefore, when the service process accesses data files, their default login security profile is used. A user can select predefined OECN software functions that are available to the OECN_RPC service. (For example, USAS functions for posting a requisition). When the user has finished using the respective web application the logout button is clicked to disconnect. Alternatively, the session may disconnect automatically after the configured inactivity timeout.

The system forces users to periodically change their passwords. The systems manager sets passwords to expire when a new user identification code is issued. New users must log in "interactively" to change their passwords. Notification of password expiration for existing users occurs automatically prior to the password expiration date. The NOACSC has established minimum password lengths for all user accounts. When a user logs in to the USAS and/or USPS web applications, the user authorization file is updated to reflect that a non-interactive login has occurred. When a user logs in to the FISCWEB application, the user authorization file is not updated to reflect that a login has occurred.

The operating system has system parameters which, when set appropriately, control and monitor sign-on attempts. There are parameters in place to control certain aspects of the sign-on procedure, which include the following:

- The terminal name is part of the association string for the terminal mode of break-in detection.
- The user is restricted on the length of time they have to correctly enter a password on a terminal on which the system password is in effect.

- The number of times a user can try to log in over a phone line or network connection. Once the specified number of attempts has been made without success, the user loses the carrier.
- The length of time allowed between login retry attempts after each login failure.
- The length of time a user terminal, or node, is permitted to attempt a logon before the system assumes that a break-in attempt is occurring and evasive action is taken.
- The period for which evasive action is taken is variable and will grow as further logon failures are detected from the suspect source.

System parameter standards have been established through the use of HP established defaults. Any changes are logged and reviewed by the executive director and/or network services manager.

A timeout program, HITMAN, is used to monitor terminal inactivity and log-off inactive users after a predetermined period of time of non-use. The use of this program helps to reduce the risk of an unattended terminal being used to enter unauthorized transactions. The web applications also have a time-out feature that was created by the SSDT. This allows the NOACSC to modify the time-out parameter to match NOACSC policies. Also, timeout programs aid in efficient use of system resources by maintaining connectivity with only active system users.

The User Identification Codes (UIC) are individually assigned to all accounts. UIC based protection controls access to objects such as files, directories, and volumes.

The system directory contains security files that control the security parameters for the system. When a user attempts to gain access to an object, such as a file or directory, the system compares the user's User Identification Code (UIC) to the owner's UIC for that object. In UIC-based protection, the relationship between the user's UIC and the object's UIC determines whether access is granted. Owner relationships are divided into four categories:

- SYSTEM: Any of the following: (1) Users with a UIC group number between 1 and SYSGEN parameter MAXSYSGROUP (default decimal 8, octal 10). (2) Users with system privileges (SYSPRV). (3) Users with group privileges (GRPPRV) whose UIC group number matches the UIC group number on the object. (4) Users whose UIC matches the owner UIC of the volume on which the file is located.
- OWNER: Users with the same UIC as the object's owner.
- GROUP: Users with the same UIC group number as the object's owner.
- WORLD: All users, including those in SYSTEM, OWNER, and GROUP.

Through the protection code, each category of users can be allowed or denied read, write, execute, and delete access. The default file protection is for (1) SYSTEM having read, write, execute and delete capabilities; (2) OWNER having read, write, execute and delete capabilities; (3) GROUP having read and execute capabilities; and (4) WORLD having no access capabilities.

Through a firewall and switch, user entities have been set up with sub-networks that have addresses not recognizable to the Internet, known as a private internal network. The firewall and switch also prevent all outside connections from accessing inside hosts or servers, unless the IP address originated from inside the network or the user entity requests certain access to their network from outside (i.e. HTTP, and e-mail, etc.). The NOACSC staff use an internal wireless access point to provide a convenient means of access to the network. Wireless traffic is encrypted from point to point within the building. Access to the wireless device's configuration is controlled through password protection.

Access to the OECN software packages is controlled at the ITC level by a security mechanism called the OECN Security Authorization (OSA) utility. Access to specific packages is provided by granting the appropriate operating system identifiers to authorized users. Each application package has a set of unique identifiers that permit access to programs. In addition to the standard identifiers for each package, a pass through identifier can be used to further customize access. OSA is used in conjunction with the OECN menu processor utility thus allowing the users to see only the items they are authorized to execute. UIC-based protection prevents WORLD write or delete access to USAS, USPS, and SAAS/EIS application data files.

A powerful identifier, OECN_SYSMAN, grants all access privileges to all state developed software and is restricted to authorized NOACSC staff. In addition, the BYPASS privilege automatically grants the user the OECN_SYSMAN identifier. The BYPASS privilege is an operating system privilege and functions the same for all ITCs.

To limit access to security files, the NOACSC has limited the WORLD access for the user authorization file, which contains account information to identify which users are allowed access to accounts on the system; the proxy file, which contains proxy account information to identify which remote users are allowed access to proxy accounts on the system; and the rights file, which contains names of the reserved system identifiers and identifiers for each user.

The write and delete access capabilities are not activated for WORLD access to the files in the system directory. The UIC associated with each of these files is within the MAXSYSGROUP number.

Certain privileges can override all UIC-based and ACL protection. The operating system analyzes privileges included in the user's UAF record and places the user in one of seven categories depending on which privileges have been granted to the user. Default privileges are those authorized privileges that are automatically granted at login. If an authorized privilege is not a default privilege, it will not automatically be effective at login, and must be enabled or disabled by the user. All user entity users have NORMAL privileges.

Remote access to the firewall and various switches is restricted through password protection. Additionally, passwords are encrypted in the devices' configurations.

The data processing department is in an enclosed area, secured by both a key lock and an ADT alarm system. All doors are locked during off hours. During daytime hours, all doors entering the building and to the computer room remain locked at all times. The Lima Security Inc. monitors all building doors and motion detectors 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The following items assist in controlling the computer room to protect it from adverse environmental conditions:

- Fire extinguishers.
- Heat alarm in the event the temperature exceeds preset level.

- 2 split Goodman units are used to monitor temperature and humidity.
- All devices are connected to battery backup systems.
- Entire building utilizes a standby natural gas powered generator that can run the entire building.

The environmental controls and alarms are attached to the security system, which will alert the security company if something is detected. The security company will then contact the appropriate personnel.

IT Operations

Traditional computer operations procedures are minimal because user entity personnel initiate all application jobs and are primarily responsible for ensuring the timeliness and completeness of processing. All NOACSC employees have access to an operations procedures manual, which provides directions and guidelines for most of the operational functions performed. In addition, all users, except students, have access to the SSDT website that contains user and technical documentation for the applications.

The NOACSC staff has privileges that permit them to assist participating user entities in performing data entry transactions. The privilege is necessary in order to respond to requests to resolve data entry inaccuracies. NOACSC personnel are not allowed to make modifications to user entity data outside the normal application process. Additionally, NOACSC requires approval via e-mail or phone call (help desk ticket) prior to assisting user entities. In addition, NOACSC as part of the fiscal year end procedures runs the FISCALCD.COM for USAS and USPS reports. The reports created by this command file are put on the web and also burned to CDs that are given to the user entities. The user entities may print out an "AUDIT" report, which shows activity changes to the data file for changes made through the application.

Operations at the NOACSC consist primarily of application installation, system software installation, backup procedures, restart and recovery procedures, and maintenance procedures. The NOACSC also serves as a help-line to the user entities. The user entity's users call the NOACSC whenever they have a problem with applications or hardware.

NOACSC is responsible for operational maintenance tasks, such as system backups, file rebuilds, log reports, and other maintenance directed at the whole system. They use two automated applications to schedule and perform these tasks.

User entities are responsible for handling abnormal terminations. If the users cannot solve the problem, they will contact the NOACSC staff. Service Express is contacted for hardware problems that cannot be solved by the NOACSC staff. The NOACSC staff often handles daily problems (e.g., terminal lockups or program crashes) over the phone. If necessary, a staff person will come on-site to resolve the problem.

Network devices at the NOACSC are continuously monitored with the use of the Pinger application software. The program continuously contacts all network devices. In the event a device does not respond, a network technician is contacted through an automated process to resolve the issue. Full system image backups are performed daily to disks located at Elida Local schools. In addition, daily data disk backups are performed nightly, with that data being replicated to Van Wert. Nightly Tape backups are also performed for all data except for archive data, which is backed up to tape on Friday nights. All backup tapes are stored in the onsite bank vault daily, with the full system backup tape from Friday night being rotated to an offsite storage location on Wednesday's.

In addition, all data processing equipment is covered under an insurance policy.

COMPLEMENTARY USER ENTITY CONTROLS

The applications were designed with the assumption that certain controls would be implemented by user entities. This section describes additional controls that should be in operation at the user entities to complement the controls at the ITC. User auditors should consider whether the following controls have been placed in operation at the user entity:

1. User entities should have controls over their own web applications which access their data stored at the NOACSC to ensure only thoroughly tested and authorized web applications are implemented.
2. User entities should maintain current service level agreements with the NOACSC for USAS, USPS, SAAS, and technical support.
3. User entity management should have practices to ensure users are aware of the NOACSC security policies and that the users take precautions to ensure passwords are not compromised.
4. User entity management should immediately request the NOACSC to revoke the access privileges of user entity personnel when they leave or are otherwise terminated.
5. User entities should have documented acceptable use policies to define the activities deemed appropriate for use of the Internet. Internet users should be required to accept the terms of the policy before access is provided.
6. User entity management should retain signed copies of the authorization form for new user accounts and changes to existing accounts.
7. Access privileges should only be issued to authorized users who need access to computer resources to perform their job function.
8. PCs and terminals should be protected against damage or misuse by having separate areas, either independent rooms or sections of rooms that restrict access to only authorized individuals.
9. Communication lines, junctions and modems should be secured in an area that restricts access to only authorized individuals.
10. The user entity should retain source documents for an adequate period to help ensure data can be re-entered in the event that data files are destroyed prior to being backed up and rotated off-site.
11. The user entity should establish and enforce a formal data retention schedule with the NOACSC for the various application data files.

The complementary user entity controls presented above do not represent a comprehensive set of all the controls that should be employed by user entities. Other controls may be required at the user entity.

SECTION 4 – INDEPENDENT SERVICE AUDITOR'S DESCRIPTION OF TESTS OF CONTROLS AND RESULTS

This section is intended to provide interested parties with information sufficient to obtain an understanding of those aspects of the NOACSC's internal control that may be relevant to user entity's internal control, and reduce the assessed level of control risk below the maximum for certain financial statement assertions.

The broad objectives of data processing controls should be achieved by a combination of the procedures that are employed in various segments of the transaction processing system, for example procedures performed at the NOACSC and procedures performed at user entities that utilize the NOACSC.

For each of the control objectives listed below, only those controls which contribute to the attainment of the related control objective are described and were tested.

IT GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND RELATED CONTROLS

Changes to Existing Applications and Systems

Changes to Existing Applications and Systems - Control Objective: Change Requests - Management should be involved in monitoring changes/upgrades to existing applications or systems to ensure they operate as intended.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
In order to maintain continued support of the application software provided by the SSDT. ITCs are expected to apply updates in a timely manner. Thirty (30) days after the release date is the expectation to maintain support from SSDT.	A cyclical redundancy check (CRC) of the USAS, USPS, OECN, and SAAS/EIS object files at NOACSC was compared to the CRCs of the object files at the SSDT.	No exceptions noted.
The SSDT distributes release notes explaining the changes, enhancements and problems corrected. Updated user and system manuals are also made available.	Inspected the release notes and updated manuals for the most recent releases.	No exceptions noted.
Documentation for the current version of the operating system and new releases are provided on the HP web site.	Inspected the online documentation for the most recent version of the operating system to confirm it is available to NOACSC staff.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security

IT Security - Control Objective: Security Management - Management should ensure the implementation of access control policies, which are based on the level of risk arising from access to programs and data.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
The NOACSC requires a standard form for user authorization for all users other than NOACSC staff. The authorization form must be signed by the appropriate management before adding, modifying or removing a user account on the system.	<p>Sampled 15 accounts from a population of 151 new users and inspected the user authorization forms to confirm the required signatures were present.</p> <p>Sampled 3 accounts from a population of 9 modified users and inspected the user authorization forms to confirm the required signatures were present.</p> <p>Sampled 6 accounts from a population of 41 removed users to confirm an account removal request did exist (either email or signed form), and account removal was requested by appropriate level of authority.</p>	No exceptions noted.
Quarterly, the account review team meets to review all OpenVMS accounts that are older than 120 days. Accounts are reviewed for removal, if needed.	Inspected 120 day review documentation to confirm the 120 day process.	No exceptions noted
Detection control alarms are enabled through the operating system to track security related events, such as break-in attempts and excessive login failures. These events are logged to audit journals for monitoring of potential security violations.	Inspected the enabled security audits to confirm security violations are being logged.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: Security Management - Management should ensure the implementation of access control policies, which are based on the level of risk arising from access to programs and data.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
Security violations are extracted, compiled into summary and detailed security reports, and e-mailed to the NOACSC staff, for review, daily through command procedures on the system.	Inspected the following information relating to the security monitor report to confirm reports are produced and available for review daily: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security monitor reports. • Command procedure used to generate the reports. • Scheduler job parameters for the security monitor reports. 	No exceptions noted.
Anti-virus software interactively scans all inbound and outbound email on the mail server and file server before the mail is forwarded to the virtual Alpha. Updates to the ESET definitions occur at regular intervals.	Inspected the properties on the ESET server to confirm virus definition files are updated and incoming traffic is scanned for viruses and spam.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: System Level Access Controls - Access to the computer system, programs, and data should be appropriately restricted.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
The use of wild card characters in proxy accounts is restricted to ensure proxy accounts are specifically defined to prevent blanket access.	Inspected the proxy listing to confirm wild card characters are not used.	No exceptions noted.
Access to the operating system command line is restricted to authorized users.	Inspected user accounts that do not have the AUDIT, CAPTIVE, DISCTLY, DISUSER, or RESTRICTED flags set with the manager network/student to confirm the appropriateness of the accounts.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: System Level Access Controls - Access to the computer system, programs, and data should be appropriately restricted.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
Password parameters are in place to aid in the authentication of user access to the system. Passwords used by individual profiles are in accordance with the password policies established by NOACSC.	<p>Inspected the results of extracted information from the user authorization file to identify:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accounts with password minimum length less than the NOACSC standards. • Accounts with a password lifetime greater than the NOACSC standards. 	No exceptions noted.
Password expiration for the web applications is defined at the system or process level.	Inspected the system logical that controls remote access to confirm password expiration is enforced for the web applications.	No exceptions noted.
Log-in parameters have been set to control and monitor sign-on attempts.	Inspected the system log-in parameters to confirm parameters were set to control and monitor sign-on attempts.	No exceptions noted.
System and web application activity is monitored and inactive users are automatically disconnected after a predetermined amount of idle time that meets industry standards.	<p>Inspected the HITMAN parameters to confirm they were set to logoff inactive users. In addition, identified protected accounts and confirmed the appropriateness of accounts with the manager network/student.</p> <p>Inspected the system startup file to confirm the HITMAN utility was part of the startup process.</p> <p>Inspected the configuration for the timeout values on the OECN RPC service.</p> <p>Inspected the configuration for the timeout values on the USAS and USPS web system.</p>	<p>First and second warnings are given at 36 and 48 minutes respectively, with processes being killed at 60 minutes of idle time.</p> <p>No other exceptions noted.</p>
Access to production data files and programs is restricted to authorized users.	Inspected the file protection masks to identify production data files with WORLD access and executable files with WORLD write and/or delete access.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: System Level Access Controls - Access to the computer system, programs, and data should be appropriately restricted.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
A private internal network and firewall are used to control internet traffic and maintain a logical segregation between user entities.	<p>Inspected the network diagram to confirm components of the network that control Internet access.</p> <p>Inspected settings in the firewall configuration to confirm Internet traffic is restricted through the firewall and to confirm the existence of a private internal network.</p>	No exceptions noted.
The wireless access point used by NOACSC staff is encrypted to prevent unauthorized access to the system.	Inspected the wireless router configuration to confirm encryption is used.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: Application Level Access Controls - Access to particular functions within applications (e.g., approving payment of vendors) should be appropriately restricted to ensure the segregation of duties and prevent unauthorized activity.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
Users are restricted to predefined logical access identifiers that grant varying access privileges based on requests from user management.	<p>Inspected all active user accounts with the OECN identifiers for the USAS, USPS, and SAAS/EIS application systems.</p> <p>Inspected the reports to confirm the identifiers were used to segregate access to the applications.</p> <p>Selected 15 accounts from a population of 151 new users and inspected the user authorization forms to confirm the access requested matched the access granted.</p> <p>Selected 3 accounts from a population of 9 modified users and inspected the user authorization forms to confirm the access requested matched the access granted.</p>	No exceptions noted.
The OECN_SYSMAN identifier that grants all access privileges for all state developed applications is restricted to authorized NOACSC users.	<p>Inspected accounts from the user authorization file with the OECN_SYSMAN identifier.</p> <p>Confirmed the appropriateness of the listed accounts with the manager network/student.</p>	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: System Software and Utilities Access Controls - Use of master passwords, powerful utilities and system manager facilities should be adequately controlled.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
WORLD access to "key" system files is restricted.	<p>Inspected the file protection masks on the system files to confirm WORLD write and/or delete access was absent.</p> <p>Inspected the file protection masks on the security files to confirm WORLD access was absent.</p>	No exceptions noted.
System level UICs and accounts with elevated privileges are restricted to authorized personnel as determined by NOACSC staff. UICs belonging to the system group are determined by the parameter value for MAXSYSGROUP. UICs less than the MAXSYSGROUP value have system level privileges.	<p>Identified the MAXSYSGROUP value.</p> <p>Extracted accounts from the user authorization file to identify accounts with a UIC less than the MAXSYSGROUP value.</p> <p>Inspected the listings with the manager network/student regarding the appropriateness of the listed accounts.</p>	No exceptions noted.
An alternate user authorization file is not permitted to be used and does not exist.	<p>Inspected the value of the alternate user authorization parameter to confirm an alternate file is not permitted.</p> <p>Inspected the system directory listings to confirm an alternate user authorization file did not exist.</p>	No exceptions noted.
Remote administration of the firewall used to control Internet access is restricted.	Inspected the firewall and main switch/router configurations to confirm remote administration was permitted and to confirm passwords are required to access the configuration menus.	No exceptions noted.

IT Security - Control Objective: Physical Security - Computer facilities and data should have appropriate physical access restrictions and be properly protected from environmental dangers.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
Physical access to the computer room and its contents is restricted to authorized personnel.	Inspected the computer room and inquired with the executive director regarding personnel access to the room. Inspected the service agreement and payment documentation to the Lima Security Inc.	No exceptions noted.
Environmental controls are in place to protect against and/or detect fire, water, humidity, or changes in temperature.	Inspected the computer room with the executive director to confirm the existence of the environmental controls.	No exceptions noted.

IT Operations

IT Operations - Control Objective: System Administration and Maintenance - Appropriate procedures should be established to ensure that the system is properly maintained and monitored.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
A service agreement with Service Express covers maintenance and failures on the computer hardware.	Inspected the Service Express agreement for services covered, period of coverage, and the corresponding payment documentation to confirm the agreement was in place during the audit period.	No exceptions noted.
NOACSC runs routine system maintenance programs such as cleanup of data files, backup creation, and security log creation.	Inspected the startup file and the scheduler procedure listing to confirm routine system maintenance programs are initiated at startup and automatically scheduled to run.	No exceptions noted.
Software monitors network performance and alerts staff of hardware failures.	Inspected the system status screen for the network monitoring software with the manager network/student to confirm the network monitoring software is used to detect and resolve hardware problems.	No exceptions noted.
All data center hardware and software equipment is covered by an insurance policy.	Inspected the property insurance policy and proof of payment for coverage of NOACSC equipment to confirm coverage was in place during the audit period.	No exceptions noted.

IT Operations - Control Objective: Backup - Up-to-date backups of programs and data should be available in emergencies.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
Daily full backups of systems and data are performed Sunday through Saturday. Full backups are automated.	Inspected the backup command procedure and an example of the daily backup log with the manager network/student to confirm backup procedures.	No exceptions noted.

IT Operations - Control Objective: Backup - Up-to-date backups of programs and data should be available in emergencies.		Control Objective Has Been Met
<i>Control Procedures:</i>	<i>Test Descriptions:</i>	<i>Test Results:</i>
Backup tapes are stored in a secure on-site location and rotated to a secure off-site location regularly. Additionally, backup tape listings are used to track the location of backups.	<p>Confirmed backup tape rotation procedures with the manager network/student.</p> <p>Inspected the on-site and off-site storage locations to confirm the backups were stored in secure locations.</p> <p>Inspected the backup tape listing to confirm the backups listed were stored at either the on-site or off-site storage locations.</p>	No exceptions noted.
Backups of programs and data are replicated to offsite servers.	<p>Inspected the offsite backup command procedure to confirm backups are automated and scheduled.</p> <p>Inspected example backup log and verification emails to confirm the backup status is verified and monitored.</p>	No exceptions noted.

SECTION 5 - OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SERVICE ORGANIZATION (*Unaudited*)**INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER PROFILE
OHIO EDUCATION COMPUTER NETWORK**CENTER DATA

Name:	Northwest Ohio Area Computer Services Cooperative (NOACSC)
Number:	5
Node Name:	NOACSC
Chairperson:	R. Todd Schmutz Superintendent Pandora-Gilboa Local Schools schmutzt@pgrockets.org
Fiscal Officer:	Brenda Core, Treasurer Brenda@noacsc.org
Administrator:	Ray Burden Executive Director NOACSC ray@noacsc.org
Address:	4277 East Rd Elida, OH 45807
Telephone:	419-228-7417
FAX:	419-222-5635
Website:	www.noacsc.org

OTHER CENTER STAFF

David Rowe	Support services network
Brenda Core	Support services fiscal
Carolyn Winhover	Support services fiscal
Dave Daugherty	Support services network
Kevin Hellman	Manager network/student
Eric Schumm	Support services network
Sheila Rowe	Support services EMIS
Dan Pottkotter	Support services student
Bonnie Blachly	Support services library
Jaime Best	Support services student
Jennifer Schwartz	Support services office assistant
Scott Schaffner	Support services Developer/DBA
Alanna Pugsley	Support services student
Michelle Buss	Support services fiscal
Jenni Aukerman	Support services EMIS
Nick Shrider	Support services tech
B Hermiller	Support services tech

HARDWARE DATA

Central Processors and Peripheral Equipment

CPU Unit 1

<u>Model Number</u>	<u>Installed</u>	<u>Capacity/Density/Speed</u>
CPU: Dell PowerEdge R710 Dual Intel(R) Xeon® CPU E5620 @ 2.40GHz Stromasys Charon-AXP	Lines/Ports: 3	Memory Installed: 64 GB
Disk: 300GB	Units: 8	Total Capacity: 1.8 TB available
Tape Unit: Dell PowerVault 124T	Units: 1	Max Density: 200 GB
Printer: HP4000	Units: 1	Print Speed: 17 PPM
Printer: HP8150	Units: 2	Print Speed: 32 PPM

USER ENTITY SITE DATA

<u>IRN</u>	<u>USER ENTITY SITE</u>	<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>USAS</u>	<u>USPS</u>	<u>SAAS</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
043885	Delphos CSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
044222	Lima CSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045211	Bluffton EVSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045740	Allen County ESC	Allen	X	X	X	X
045757	Allen East LSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045765	Bath LSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045773	Elida LSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045781	Perry LSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045799	Shawnee LSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
045807	Spencerville LSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
050773	Apollo JVSD	Allen	X	X	X	X
151175	West Central Learning Academy	Allen	X	X		X
044727	St. Marys CSD	Auglaize	X	X	X	X
044982	Wapakoneta CSD	Auglaize	X	X	X	X
043984	Findlay CSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047407	Hancock County ESC	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047415	Arcadia LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047423	Arlington LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X

USER ENTITY SITE DATA

<u>IRN</u>	<u>USER ENTITY SITE</u>	<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>USAS</u>	<u>USPS</u>	<u>SAAS</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
047431	Cory-Rawson LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047449	Liberty Benton LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047456	McComb LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047464	Van Buren LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
047472	Vanlue LSD	Hancock	X	X	X	X
045187	Ada EVSD	Hardin	X	X	X	X
043729	Celina CSD	Mercer	X	X	X	X
045310	Coldwater EVSD	Mercer	X	X	X	X
048546	Mercer County ESC	Mercer	X	X	X	X
048595	Fort Recovery LSD	Mercer	X	X	X	X
048553	Marion LSD	Mercer	X	X	X	X
048579	Parkway LSD	Mercer	X	X	X	X
048587	St. Henry Conservatory SD	Mercer	X	X	X	X
045575	Paulding EVSD	Paulding	X	X	X	X
048991	Antwerp LSD	Paulding	X	X	X	X
049031	Wayne Trace LSD	Paulding	X	X	X	X
134999	Western Buckeye ESC	Paulding/Van Wert	X	X	X	X
049304	Putnam County ESC	Putnam	X	X	X	X

USER ENTITY SITE DATA

<u>IRN</u>	<u>USER ENTITY SITE</u>	<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>USAS</u>	<u>USPS</u>	<u>SAAS</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
049312	Col. Grove LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049320	Continental LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049338	Jennings LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049346	Kalida LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049353	Leipsic LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049361	Miller City-New Cleveland LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049379	Ottawa-Glandorf LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049387	Ottoville LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
049395	Pandora-Gilboa LSD	Putnam	X	X	X	X
044966	Van Wert CSD	Van Wert	X	X	X	X
050351	Crestview LSD	Van Wert	X	X	X	X
050369	Lincolnview LSD	Van Wert	X	X	X	X
051672	Vantage JVSD	Van Wert	X	X	X	X
011479	LifeLinks Community School	Van Wert	X	X	X	X
050708	North Baltimore LSD	Wood	X		X	X
000402	Findlay Digital Academy	Hancock	X			X
043638	Bowling Green City Schools	Wood			X	X
044891	Tiffin CSD	Seneca	X	X	X	X

USER ENTITY SITE DATA

<u>IRN</u>	<u>USER ENTITY SITE</u>	<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>USAS</u>	<u>USPS</u>	<u>SAAS</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
014080	Aladdin Academy	Mercer				X
048223	Springfield LSD	Lucas	X	X	X	X
000268	Tiffin Digital	Seneca				X
045260	Carey Exempted Village Schools	Wyandot	X	X	X	X
TOTALS:			55	53	54	58

“OTHER” - User Entity uses service(s) other than USAS, USPS and/or SAAS/EIS.



Dave Yost • Auditor of State

NORTHWEST OHIO AREA COMPUTER SERVICES COOPERATIVE (NOACSC)

ALLEN COUNTY

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION

This is a true and correct copy of the report which is required to be filed in the Office of the Auditor of State pursuant to Section 117.26, Revised Code, and which is filed in Columbus, Ohio.

Susan Babbitt

CLERK OF THE BUREAU

**CERTIFIED
DECEMBER 7, 2017**